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ABSTRACT 
This article analyses and compares the different indices that classify 
central banks on the basis of their autonomy. A number of aspects 
affecting central bank autonomy are listed and described. These aspects 
are compared with the facetr of central bank independence actually 
included in the classifications, assessing their degree of 'coverage. 
Certain problems related to the elaboration of the indices are addressed. 
A comparison is also made of the results of the different classifications. 
Finally, the effect of the Maastricht Treaty-related institutional changes 
on the independence of EU central banks is est.imated) showing a 
substantial upgrading in absolute and relative terms of this group of 
countries. 
Key words: central banks t monetary autonomy, monetary policy, 
exchange-rate policy, comparative analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Interest in studies on the autonomy of central banks has heightened in 
recent years as the idea that autonomy gJ.ves better macroeconomic results 
has gained popularity. Numerous studies have shown empirical evidence 
linking greater central bank autonomy to better control of inflation. This 
has made it necessary to estimate a variable that is very difficult to 
quantify. which is the autonomy of central banks. The efforts involved 
in these studies are admirable and helpful, but they run up against major 
practical obstacles. This article reviews recent papers on the 
classification of central banks according to their degree of autonomy. It 
describes the methodology used, analyses the main problems encountered 
and compares the results. 
The aim of this article is to try to answer the following questions. How 
reliable are the classifications of central banks by independence? On 
which aspects do they focus? How ample is their coverage? How similar -or 
how different- is their methodology? How sensitive are the results to 
changes in legislation? In particular, what may be the effect of the 
reforms linked to the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty for EU 
countries? . 
The structure of the article is as follows: the introduction indicates 
which studies will be discussed; Section 2 identifies and .defines the 
relevant features determining central bank autonomy; in Section 3 the 
methodology and general characteristics of the studies that attempt to 
quantify this variable are described; Section 4 discusses the main 
problems encountered in the development of these indices; in Section 5, 
the results of the studies are compared; in Section 6, some caveats 
regarding the effects of changes in legislation on these indices are 
considered; and finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
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Studies on central bank autonomy can be classified into four major 
groups. 
First, purely theoretical papers in which the rationale for central bank 
au tonomy is discussed. In general, these articles are based on 
observations of the problems of time inconsistency between the objectives 
of economic policy, which generate economic cycles linked to the political 
or electoral cycle. Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), Alesina 
(1989) and Cukierman (1992), among others, develop these arguments. 
Second, another series of studies, which will be referred to in Section 
2, focuses on the institutional aspects of central bank autonomy (in other 
words, they attempt to identify the characteristics of the most 
independent central banks). 
Third, some studies focus on the development of indices or 
classifications of central banks according to their autonomy. 
Finally, there is much empirical literature that attempts to determine 
whether there is an inverse relationship between central bank autonomy 
and the inflation rate (or its variability). Some studies of this type also 
link central bank autonomy with other macroeconomic variables, such as 
GDP growth or the public-sector deficit. 
For the purposes of this article, the most interesting studies are those 
included in the third group (development of indices on central bank 
autonomy) . However, many of them also fall into category four 
(empirical), since the purpose of the classifications is to contrast 
hypotheses on the macroeconomic effects of central bank autonomy. 
In addition, in order to evaluate the different classifications, it is 
useful to consider as a point of reference studies of the second group, 
which refer to the institutional aspects of central bank autonomy. One of 
the interesting features of the literature on central bank autonomy is 
precisely the relative divorce between institutional papers .. generally 
very broad, covering a wide range of questions linked to the degree of 
autonomy of central banks and frequently based on ample questionnaires 
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on national characteristics and practices- and the studies focusing on 
developing autonomy indices, which are generally confined to very partial 
considerations. The difficulties involved in obtaining, classifying, 
normalising and aggregating information on the statutes and practices 
that govern central bank actions are largely to blame for this contrast. 
However, it is also true that some of the studies that present indices of 
central bank autonomy are not very selective when it comes to identifying 
the most relevant features; in addition, many of these classifications 
simply restate earlier ones. This may be because the development of 
indices for central bank autonomy has generally been linked more closely 
to their use in empirical studies (of the fourth group) than in studies 
considering the different facets of that autonomy (of the second group). 
2. Key features of central bank autonomy 
The principal studies that identify the key features of central bank 
autonomy are those by Fair' (1980), Skanland (1984), Swinburne and 
Castello-Branco (1991) and Cukierman (1992). One interesting exercise 
is to compare the features that could potentially be linked to central bank 
autonomy with those that are actually used for constructing indices. 
However, when discussing the characteristics of central bank 
autonomy, some precautionary comments should be made. First, the 
concept of central bank autonomy itself is somewhat elusive: theoretical 
or legal autono"1Y may differ substantially from practical autonomy, and 
both can be understood as subject to the area of monetary policy or 
extended to other central bank functions (these questions are addressed 
in greater detail in Section 4). Second, the aspects of central bank 
autonomy can be addressed with very different degrees of detail, ranging 
from a general description of areas and functions to a detailed formulation 
of questions that could be included in a questionnaire; this hinders the 
objective comparison between what should be addressed to evaluate 
central bank autonomy and what is actually included in the indices. 
Third, not all features of central bank autonomy are equally important, 
being the simple sum of several aspects as arbitrary as their weighting 
according to a discretionary criterion. Fourth, the different facets 
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discussed below are closely interrelated, which means that greater or 
lesser autonomy in one area is not independent of the other institutional 
characteristics of the central bank. 
With these cautions in mind, and based on the studies mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, 22 features have been chosen which affect the 
degree of autonomy of a central bank. These are grouped into five large 
areas: i) functional dependence and responsibilities; ii) governing 
bodies; ill) financial independence; iv) functions other than monetary 
policy; and v) other considerations. Underlying this approach is a notion 
of autonomy that is more closely related to its legal than to its practical 
sense, and which is initially limited to the area of monetary policy; 
however, autonomy in setting monetary policy is not independent from the 
attribution of other possible functions to the central bank, and for this 
reason they are incorporated into the analysis. The level of aggregation 
used is intermediate: an effort has been made to achieve the greatest 
possible separation between factors which are substantially different, 
within a single area, without developing concrete questions in the style 
of a questionnaire. Under the latter approach, the number of aspects of 
central bank autonomy would have been much higher. 
The features considered as influencing central bank autonomy will be 
commented upon briefly below, although they will not be discussed in 
depth, since this is not the objective of this article. The aim of this 
section is rather to present these features, in order to evaluate 
afterwards the classifications under analysis. 
I. Functional dependence and attribution of responsibilities 
1. Formal dependence of the central bank. 
The central bank may depend upon the government (which is the most 
common case), upon the Parliament (as in the United States), or it may 
not depend formally upon any other institution (as in Germany, where the 
Bundesbank is accountable to public opinion). 
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2. Formal assignment of responsibility to develop monetary policy. 
The development of the broad outlines of monetary policy may be the 
exclusive responsibility of the government, the exclusive responsibility 
of the central bank, or it may be shared by both. 
3. Formal assignment of responsibility to implement monetary policy. 
The central bank may be subject to government directives as regards 
the general objectives of monetary policy, but have autonomy for its 
implementation. In this case, it is important to know how the dividing line 
is drawn between these two areas of responsibility, whether the central 
bank is required or is not required to follow government directives, etc. 
4 .  Provisions for resolution of conflicts. 
In some cases, certain mechanisms have been established for situations 
of conflict, such as the following: the government may suspend the 
application of certain measures adopted by the central bank for a limited 
period of time; the discrepancies and arguments of the government and 
the central bank may become public; the Parliament may play the role of 
an arbiter in the dispute; etc. It is not clear whether these provisions 
increase or decrease the autonomy of the central bank. Eizenga (1987) 
argues that in the case of the Netherlands, they enhance the bank's 
autonomy, while in the case of Canada it is generally accepted that the 
reform of the 1967 statute -which arose from a ,<onflict between the 
government and the central bank, and which included provisions for the 
resolution of these conflicts- reduced the de facto autonomy of the central 
bank (Fair, 1980 and Swinburne and CasteUo-Branco, 1991). Doyle and 
Weale (1994) conclude that override provisions are necessary and that, 
therefore, the optimal institutional arrangement is partial instead of full 
independence of the central bank. 
5. Statutory objectives. 
In general, central banks with clear, hierarchical and non-conflicting 
objectives are more independent. The inclusion of a price stability 
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objective, which is pre-eminent over all others, confers greater autonomy 
on a central bank. 
6 .  Democratic accountability and supervision of monetary policy. 
The degree of autonomy of a central bank also depends on the 
mechanisms by which it is accountable for its activities and its policies, 
and on which institutions have democratic control over it: the 
government, the Parliament, the judiciary .... It is not true that central 
banks with less democratic responsibility are necessarily more 
independent; there are many arguments to the contrary (CEPR, 1994). 
7. Mechanisms for reform of legislation governing the central bank. 
Given a degree of central bank autonomy, its greater or lesser de facto 
autonomy also depends on how difficult it is to change the legislation 
governing its independence. For instance, the need for a constitutional 
amendment to reform the central bank statute in some countries means 
that existing legislation is more stable than in other countries, where the 
statute could be changed through normal legislative processes. From this 
point of view, the link between central bank independence and an 
international Treaty (as in the case of the Maastricht Treaty-related 
legislation in EU countries) establishes an additional constraint on the 
process to reform this legislation. This question will be addressed in 
Section 6. 
11. Governing bodies 
8. Composition of the governing bodies. 
The number, characteristics and functions of the governing bodies and 
their components have an impact on the institution's autonomy. 
Among the factors which affect the degree of central bank autonomy are 
the following: whether members are appointed or ex-officio; whether 
there are government representatives; the presence of members with or 
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without a voting right; the existence of executive and non-executive 
members of the Council; whether there are regional1 or sectoral 
representatives on the Board, as well as representatives of the private 
shareholders, when relevant. 
9. Election of senior officials. 
The autonomy of senior central bank officials depends not only on who 
appoints them, but also on the mechanisms for nomination, 
recommendation, approval, etc. , in procedures that may be very 
complex2• 
10. Mandate of senior officials. 
The length of the mandates of the members of the governing bosiies, 
their overlapping with one another, and their overlapping with the 
mandates of the government or the members of the Parliament condition 
the degree of autonomy of the central bank. It should be noted, 
1 In this respect, it should be noted that the central banks that 
are generally considered to be the most independent (those of Germany, 
Switzerland and the United States) correspond to countries with a 
federal structure of government, where states or regions are 
represented in the governing bodies of the central bank. One possible 
interpretation of this fact is that federal states have a traditional 
aversion to concentration of power in the central government, and have 
developed central bank autonomy as a means of keeping monetary policy 
in the hands of an institution in whose governing bodies the interests 
of the central and peripheral authorities can be counterbalanced. 
2 In the German case, for example, some Board members are elected 
by the President of the Republic, after being nominated by the Federal 
Parliament (Bundesrat), based on regional government recommendations, 
and following consultation with the Bundesbank Board (Eijjfing,er and 
Schaling, 1993).. In the new Bank of France statute, which was approved 
in 1993, the six board members on the Monetary Policy Council are 
appointed by the Council of Ministers from a list presented jointly by 
the presidents of the Senate, the National Assembly and the Economic 
and Social Council (Cardenal, 1993). 
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however, that the legal duration of the mandate may not be the same as its 
effective duration). 
11. Renewal of mandates. 
It is generally assumed that very long and non-renewable mandates 
mean greater autonomy than shorter, renewable mandates. Longer 
mandates enhance autonomy because they guarantee a certain separation 
between central bank management and the political cycle. When combined 
with overlapping mandates, long tenures tend to favour the coincidence 
on the Board of members chosen by different governments, thus 
increasing its autonomy. The fact that a mandate is non-renewable means 
that decisions will not be made with the intention of gaining re-election. 
12. Dismissal of senior officials. 
Obviously, a central bank is less independent when it is easy for the 
government to dismiss its senior officials. 
Ill. Economic independence 
13. Limits on government financing. 
It is generally accepted that an indispensable complement to formal 
central bank autonomy is a limit on lending to the government (or its total 
prohibition). Holtfrerich (1988) concludes that in the inter-war period 
of German Hyperinflation the autonomy of the Reichsbank, in May 1922, 
was meaningless until it was accompanied by limits on government 
J cukierman ( 1992) cites the case of Argentina before the recent 
reform, where, although the legal mandate was for four years, informal 
tradition dictated that the Governor was forced to tender his 
resignation each time there was a change of government and, even every 
time a new Finance minister was appointed. As a result, the average 
effective length of the mandate of Argentine central bank Governors 
over the 1950-1990 period was only 13 months. The same study develops 
an indicator for observance of the legislation on central bank 
independence, based on the comparison between the legal and effective 
length of the mandate of the Governor. 
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borrowing, in November 1923. A conflicting view is given in Swinburne 
and Castello-Branco (1991): "Statutory limits on credit to government 
may not be particularly effective when the central bank is not 
independent, and may not be necessary when the central bank is 
independent, with a clear responsibility for monetary stability" (page 
34). However, the authors acknowledge that these limits might be useful 
"when a central bank is first made independent and needs to establish its 
credibility" (page 35) . 
It is generally accepted that the e�stence or non-existence of limits on 
government borrowing, their definition, and the forms and 
characteristics, when applicable, of credit facilities, etc., are critical 
determinants of the autonomy of central banks in practice, at least in the 
great majority of cases, in which central bank autonomy is a question of 
degree. A thorough analysis of limits on central bank lending to the 
government can be found in Cotarelli (1993). 
14. Budgetary autonomy. 
A less evident feature of the degree of autonomy of a central bank, but 
one which can be important, has to do with the budget mechanisms of the 
central bank itself: who determines its income and expenditures, how 
they are distributed, how the salaries of its employees are established 
(including those of senior officials), etc. 
15. Distribution of profits. 
This feature -who decides how central bank profits are to be 
distributed, and how this decision is made- is closely linked to the 
previous point and is also important in evaluating central bank autonomy. 
IV. Other central bank functions other than monetary policy . 
16. Banking supervision. 
An important but controversial feature of central bank autonomy is 
whether or not this institution has the responsibility over areas that could 
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conflict with monetary policy J in particular banking supervision. In 
Germany, the fact that the Bundesbank does not have responsibility for 
overseeing the banking system is generally seen as a complement to its 
independence. Jenkins (1995) finds a positive correlation between the 
regulatory burden of the central banks as regards the banking industry 
and the inflation rate, which seems to support this view. The European 
Central Bank statute is largely inspired by the German model. Folkerts­
Landau and Garber (1992) present a critique to this approach, arguing 
that a central bank that must act as a Lender of Last Resort must have the 
capacity to distinguish between liquidity and solvency problems, and this 
is best done when it is assigned the task of banking supervision. 
17. Exchange-rate policy. 
Exchange-rate policy functions are normally shared between the 
government and the central bank. Even in the cases of the most 
independent central banks (such as Germany) J the government is 
responsible for the election of the exchange-rate system and the broad 
design of exchange-rate policy·. In practice, the way conflicts between 
an independent monetary policy and an exchange-rate policy subordinated 
to political power are resolved depends mainly on the existing exchange­
rate regime. Central bank autonomy is very significant and effective 
under floating, but it becomes subordinated in practice to exogenous 
elements in a fixed exchange-rate system (Ferm,ndez de Lis, 1993)' . 
• In a few cases, the central bank has sole responsibility for 
exchange-rate policy, even as regards the election of the exchange­
rate regime. Sweden is the most conspicuous example. 
5 One interesting aspect of this problem is the idea that the 
central bank of a country under some kind of exchange-rate constraint 
(like the ERM) is, ceteria paribus, more independent the wider the 
fluctuation band (see cukierman -1992). This is because the government 
is normally responsible for setting central parities and establishing 
the parity-grid, whereas the central bank has a greater influence on 
the decision about the position of the exchange-rate within the 
fluctuation band. One interesting implication of this idea is that the 
widening of ERM bands to t15\ in August 1993 meant a certain increase 
in the de facto autonomy of participating central banks. However, it 
should also be kept in mind that greater or lesser recourse to 
realignmenta in central parities, instead of movements of the exchange 
rate within the bands, and the degree of central bank participation in 
these decisions will depend not only on the width of the band but 
mainly on numerous additional factors� 
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Most central banks have exclusive responsibility to implement 
exchange-rate policy. An exception is in the United States, where the 
Treasury may also intervene on foreign currency markets. Ownership of 
reserves is also a consideration which may condition the degree of 
autonomy of the central bank in carrying out its monetary and exchange 
rate policies. 
18. Other functions. 
The scope of the central bank's functions may have an impact on, its 
independence. Possible functions of a central bank, apart from monetary 
and exchange rate policies and banking supervision, include: banker of 
the government (referred to in point 13); note-issuing bank; bankers' 
bank and Lender of Last Resort; payments system and organization of 
markets; intervention in ailing financial institutions; centralized system 
for registry of credits; statistics and central balance-sheet office; 
consumer protection for banking services and deposit insurance (see 
Pellicer, 1993). An important aspect in the performance of these functions 
is whether the central bank has regulatory powers, in particular over 
financial institutions. If the central bank can issue regulations -at some 
level- that commit financial institutions, its degree of autonomy seems, in 
principle, higher than if this regulatory power were to belong completely 
to the Parliament and/or to the Government (see Lastra, 1995). 
The relationship between central bank autonomy and the exercise of 
some of these functions is not obvious. The fact that a central bank is 
responsible for some of these functions may enhance its independence; in 
other cases, it may reduce it; and in others it will depend on many other 
factors. In any case, it is clear that the area of responsibilities assigned 
to the central bank may be a very important factor in determining its 
degree of autonomy. 
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Other considerations 
19. Transparency (including publication of discussions and 
deliberations of governing bodies) . 
Although this question has not even been considered in most countries, 
a serious debate has existed for some years in the United States over 
whether the minutes of the main governing body of the central bank, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), should be published either 
immediately after its meetings or with some time lag. Proponents of 
greater transparency argue that the publication of minutes is necessary 
for the correct formation of expectations; opponents of immediate 
publication say that total transparency would render ineffective some of 
the measures adopted or announced. This debate has given rise to a 
series of studies on central bank transparency and secrecy (see, for 
example, Goodfriend, 1986)6. 
20 . Central bank ownership. 
Whether a central bank is publicly or privately owned may affect its 
autonomy. However, the different situations, in this regard, of the three 
central banks that are generally considered to be the most independent 
may be seen as evidence to the contrary: in Germany, the Bundesbank 
is 100% government owned; in the United States, the Federal Reserve 
Banks are owned by the commercial banks that are members of the 
System, but the Federal Reserve System is a government agency; and in 
Switzerland 100% of the bank's capital is in private hands. All three of 
these cases are compatible with a degree of independence that is generally 
considered to be relatively high. 
21. Limits on the use of monetary policy instruments. 
No matter what the situation of a central bank is as regards the design 
and implementation of monetary policy, there may be obstacles to the use 
6 The British government recently decided to publish the minutes 
of the meetings between the governor of the Bank of England and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to make decision-making over monetary 
policy more transparent. 
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of some instruments -such as the reserve requirements, open-market 
operations or, when applicable, direct credit control mechanisms- in the 
form of legal or administrative limitations, requirements .for prior 
authorization or consultation, etc. 
22. Autonomy in preparing and publishing reports and public 
statements on economic policy questions. 
One critical feature of central bank autonomy, but which is difficult to 
measure in practice, is its ability to affect the general direction of 
economic PQlicy. One of the clearest ways to influence economic policy is 
the publication of reports and studies and the release of public statements 
on these topics, which may help guide policy in the desired direction, 
especially if they are backed by a certain degree of technical prestige. 
3. Main characteristics of the different indices of central hank autonomy. 
The main studies that have developed indices to measure the degree of 
central bank autonomy are Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1989), Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Capie and Wood (1991), de Haan and 
Sturm (1992), Cukierman (1992), Eijjfinger and Schaling (1993) and 
Alesina and Summers (1993). 
Some of these indices simply re-build or broaden previous indices. 
Alesina's classification (1989) is quite similar to that of Bade and Parkin 
(1988), adding five more countries and considering one additional 
criterion. Eijjfinger and Schaling's classification (1993) is based to a 
large degree on that of Bade and Parkin as well. The classification of de 
Haan and Sturm (1992) is the result of adding the two classifications of 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) -political and economic-, 
excluding the features linked to banking supervision. Alesina and 
Summers' index (1993) is simply an average of those of Bade and Parkin, 
on one hand, and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, on the other, using 
a homogeneous scale. 
-17 -
These eight studies include in total eleven classifications, since Grilli, 
et. a1. present two classifications 7 and Cukierman presents three8• 
Nevertheless, for the reasons mentioned above, only four studies -
including seven classifications- can be considered as "original": Bade 
and Parkin (1988), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Capie and 
Wood (1991) and Cukierman (1992). Excluding the study by Capie and 
Wood -which is very limited and simple- the number of "original" 
classifications is reduced to six. 
Most of the classifications mentioned attempt to reflect the concept of 
"legal independence", except for the Itpractical independence" 
classification of Cukierman and the one that is based on the turnover of 
Governors, which is included in the same study. It should be noted that 
the interpretation of the last classification is not linear: the tllongevity" 
of governors -in the sense of their period in office- does not necessarily 
indicate a high degree of autonomy, but may instead reflect a complacent 
attitude towards political power, while a very high degree of turnover 
seems to be a clear sign of reduced independence. This index, therefore, 
should be seen as a useful indicator only below a certain threshold. 
Cukierman's study itself concludes that this threshold is significant for 
developing countries, but not for industrialised countries. 
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the studies cited, which 
are identified by the authors' initials and the year of publication. The 
number of countries included in the studies ranges from a minimun of 11 
[in C (92), index based on questionnaires] and a maximum of 22 [C (92), 
legal index]. For the purpose of this article, only industrialised 
7 One on "political independencell and the other on "economic 
independence". 
8 One is based on "legal independencell, another on IIgovernor 
turnover" and another on the replies to a questionnaire which was 
aimed at determining the de facto independence of central banks. 
Cukierman's study presents a synthetic classification that combines 
these three, but it has not been considered in this article for the 
reason that since weightings are set according to the coefficients of 
a regression with respect to the inflation rate, it has a certain 
bias, in the sense that the central banks of the· best performing 
countries in terms of inflation tend to be considered the most 
independent. 
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countries are considered, although some studies also include developing 
countries [especially C (92), whose legal index covers 69 countries, and 
CW (91)). Only three countries appear in all 11 classifications: 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
The period referred to in the studies is very important, since there are 
from time to time significant legal changes that modify central bank 
autonomy in the different countries. BP (88) and A (89) both cover the 
period following general floating (1972-1986). GMT (91) refers to the 
period 1950-89, as do HS (92) and ES (93), with the latter two being 
based on the former. C (92) refers to the same period (1950-1989) both 
for the legal autonomy index and that based on governor turnover. The 
former, however, is calculated for four sub-periods: 1950-59 (dollar 
standard), 1960-71 (convertible dollar), 1972-79 (oil shocks) and 1980-
1989 (disinflation and debt crisis). This breakdown permits the analysis 
of changes in the degree of legal autonomy of each central bank. The C 
(92) index, based on a questionnaire which attempts to gauge practical 
independence, refers to the decade of the 1980s. The AS (93) index is 
ambiguous in terms of chronological coverage, since it is based on an 
average of the BP (89) and GMT (91) indices, which cover different 
periods. A case apart is the CW (91) classification, which attempts to 
offer a historical perspective by analyzing the 1871-1989 period. 
The systems classifying central banks by their degree of 
independence can be divided into three types: 
a) Binary: Central banks are classified as either independent or 
dependent [CW (91)). 
b) Discreet: these present a limited number of possibilities: BP (88), 
A (89) and AS (93) use a scale of 1 to 4; ES (93) from 1 to 5; GMT (91) 
from 0 to 7 in the political independence classification and 0 to 8 for 
economic independence; HS (92) from 0 to 14. 
c) Continuous: the three classifications of C (92) are continuous, from 
o to 1. This is one of the main advantages of these classifications: In the 
features analyzed, they consider different possible levels of response 
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and, therefore, of central bank independence. The other studies are 
more simplistic from a methodological point of view, since they only accept 
"yes" or "no" answers to the questions. 
4. Main problems of the indices of central bank autonomy 
2.1. The concept of autonomy 
Most of these studies do not specify what they mean by independence 
or autonomy. Without an explicit concept of independence, it could be 
concluded that a central bank is more independent when it enjoys greater 
discretion and is subject to the least possible restrictions. But this 
approach raises some questions: is a central bank which is not assigned 
specific objectives more independent than one whose statutes assign it 
responsibility for maintaining price stability? Is a central bank that must 
pursue multiple objectives more independent than one that is required to 
focus on a single objective (such as inflation control)? In the case of a 
central bank with various functions, should independence be limited to 
the area of monetary policy, or should it be extended to other tasks? 
What are the effects of either solution on central b.ank independence? Is 
a central bank that is required to pursue a "zero inflation" objective more 
or less independent than another bank that must pursue the less precise 
objective of price stability? Is a central bank that is not subject to 
democratic control more independent? Is central bank independence 
compatible with transparency in its activities? Are both concepts 
complementary? 
The answers to some of these questions are not obvious and they affect 
the evaluation of the independence of a central bank under any 
institutional setting. Most studies that evaluate the independence of 
central banks, however, overlook these considerations. The outstanding 
exception is C (92), which explains the notion of independence that is 
being used: "The development of an independent monetary policy to 
achieve the objective of price stability in the medium term". Other recent 
studies that make an effort to clarify the concept of central bank 
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autonomy are the Roll Report (1993) and Fisher (1995), who distinguishes 
between "instrumental independence" and n goal independence" . 
4.2. Theoretical and practical independence 
Obviously, there may be discrepancies between the level of 
independence legally granted to a central bank and its degree of practical 
autonomy. The latter depends on many informal features) traditions9 
and non-quantifiable elements which are difficult to compare objectively 
across countries. These qualitative and informal factors include the 
personalities of the central bank's top officials, their prestige and 
technical expertise, the informal relationships between the central bank 
and the government, its links with financial institutions and markets, etc. 
Cukierman mentions, as a non-quantifiable element of central bank 
autonomy, the quality of its research department, since the task of 
advising the government rests on Its expertise. Of all the studies 
analysed, only Cukierman's attempts to deal with some of these features, 
with a classification based on replies to a questionnaire. 
4.3. Subjective interpretation 
All of the indices are based on the interpretation and standardisation 
of legal questions which require in many cases some subjective 
assessment. For example, the interpretation of central bank statutes in 
ES (93) is different in some aspects from that of BP (88) for five of the 
countries under analysis. The latter also differs from GMT (91) in five 
of the 12 cases. All of these differences are exclusively a matter of 
interpretation, since the questions asked and the periods under analysis 
are the same . 
• An excellent analysis of the importance of historical factors In the 
development of central bank functions and their level <;>f autonomy can be 
found in Goodhart (1988). 
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4.4. Coverage of the indices 
Section 2 reviewed the features that may influence central bank 
autonomy, giving 22 categories grouped into five large areas. Table 3 
presents a comparison of how the 11 classifications cover these 22 
categories. The letter T is used for the cases where the feature 
mentioned is totally considered in constructing the independence index; 
the letter P is used when it is only partially covered. On the last line a 
very rudimentary indicator is presented for the "coverage" of the various 
classifications, which is calculated by assigning a value of 1 to each letter 
T and a value of 0. 5 to each letter P in each column of the table. This 
exercise -which is rather simplistic- leads to the conclusion that the 
highest coverage index (5.5 corresponding to Cukierman's classification 
based on a questionnaire), represents only 25% of a potential total of 22 
points and the lowest 5% [CW (91) J. In other words, the most complete 
classification only covers one-quarter of the features that have been 
considered as possible. 
Table 3 shows that most of the studies focus on areas i) (functional 
independence and designation of responsibilities) and (ll) (governing 
bodies), while paying little or no attention to economic independence 
(ill) 10, other functions besides monetary policy (iv) and other 
considerations (v). 
4.5. Aggregation of features under consideration 
The features used to develop each index are obviously aggregated in a 
SUbjective way. Most classifications involve a simple sum of the 
characteristics under consideration. For example, in GMT (91) in the 
political independence index, the fact that the governor is not appointed 
by the government has the same weight as the fact that his mandate is 
longer than five years, or that price stability is included among the 
central bank's objectives. Only C (92) considers a weighting of 
characteristics, both in its legal index and in the one based on the 
10 The "economic independence" index of Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini focuses on features different from those of the economic 
independence concept defined in Section 2 of this article. 
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questionnaires. 
developed 11; in 
subjectively. 
In both cases, weighted and unweighted indices are 
the weighted index, the weightings are determined 
4.6. Periods under consideration 
The period under analysis is very important in quantifying the 
autonomy of central banks. On the one hand, the period should be short 
enough to rule out major changes in legislation regarding the central bank 
[or alternatively, sub-periods could be used, as in C(92) 1; on the other 
hand, if the objective is to compare the independence indices and inflation 
performance, the period must be long enough for these variables to be 
representative, and for the relationship between the former and the latter 
to stabilise (since the credibility associated with central bank autonomy 
takes time to establish). The length of the period under study ranges 
from 14 to 39 years, with the exception of CW (91), whose study covers 
118 years. The question of the effect of legal reforms is addressed in 
section 6. 
5. Comparison of the results 
Table 4 presents the independence rankings of central banks according 
to the different studies. The table presents the 15 countries that are 
included in at least two-thirds of the classifications. Table 5 compares the 
geographic coverage of industrialised countries in the different studies. 
Since the classifications have different criteria and scales, the concrete 
numerical value assigned to each central bank has not been considered, 
but rather their ranking in the classification. One implication of this 
approach is that only the order of the countries in each classification is 
considered, but not the relative distance between them. In cases where 
various countries receive the same classification -which is quite frequent-
11 However, the unweighted indices calculated in C (92) also have 
some element of weighting, since they group several questions in 
broader categories, which are simply added later: in the legal index, 
the 16 initi�l categories are grouped into 8 (see notes to Table 6, 
where the aggregation procedure is explained); in the index based on 
questionnaires, the 9 initial questions are grouped into 7. 
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all have been assigned the value of the median of the interval which they 
form in the classification12. 
The following conclusions can be made based on this table: 
o Germany, Switzerland and the United States, generally in that 
order, are the countries whose central banks appear in the first places 
(as most independent). 
o The countries ranked last (least independent) show greater 
variation. Belgium, Spain, New Zealand and Sweden frequently appear 
in the last places. 
o In the group of intermediate countries, two groups can be 
established: the countries whose central banks are more independent 
(Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands) and those whose central banks 
are less independent (Australia, France, Italy, Japan and the United 
Kingdom) . 
o The Japanese case is interesting"since it appears as one of the most 
independent central banks in the first classifications [BP (88) and A 
(89») and as one of the least in the latest ones. 
From the analysis of the results of Table 4 one may conclude that the 
classifications, although using different methodology J covering diverse 
periods and addressing aspects of central bank autonomy to some extent 
separate, tend to convey a broadly similar message about which central 
banks are more and which are less independent. The dispersion measures 
calculated in the last columns of Table 4 also tend to support this view, 
and to confirm therefore to some extent the "traditional wisdom" on 
central bank independence rankings. Nevertheless, it is true at the same 
time that some classifications seem to present a distorted view of the 
autonomy of some central banks, when compared with the others, as 
shown by the very high range of positions for each country (7.9 as the 
12 For example, if five countries are tied in fourth to eighth 
place, they have all been assigned the sixth place. 
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average distance between the maximum and the minimum position for the 
15 countries, which seems rather high). If Ifoutliers" are eliminated, the 
average range is reduced to 6.3, with most countries moving in a much 
lower interval (the I1high-range countries", excluding outliers, are 
Australia , Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Japan). 
6 .  The effects of changes in legislation. 
In estimating central bank independence, a particularly difficult 
question is how to treat possible changes in the legislation concerning 
central banks. If the final purpose of the measurement of central bank 
independence is to evaluate its effect on price stability, such an empirical 
test requires a sufficiently long period of comparison between both 
variables. However, relevant changes in central bank legislation have to 
be taken into account and, ideally, their effect on inflation performance 
should be evaluated. The problem is that these changes only affect 
macroeconomic performance with what can be a substantial delay. 
Intuitively, some of the possible changes -for instance, the prohibition 
of monetary financing- may have an immediate impact on the behaviour of 
economic agents and authorities, whereas others -for example, setting a 
clear objetive of price stability- may take longer becoming incorporated 
into agents' expectations. 
A very interesting example of legislative changes currently taking 
place is the adaptation of EU countries to the requirements of the 
Maastricht Treaty. As is widely known, the Monetary Union requires, 
according to the Treaty, an independent European System of Central 
Banks, each of whose components -national central banks- should be 
independent before the irrevocable locking of parities (in the Maastricht 
jargon, the start of Stage Three). Furthermore, as the Treaty rules out 
any monetary or privileged financing to the public sector, it includes a 
provision (articles 104 and 104 a) whereby central bank credit to the 
government or any other financing off-market shall be prohibited at the 
beginning of Stage Two (January I", 1994). Therefore, this prohibition 
has affected all EU countries since that date. 
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As a case study of the effect of institutional changes on central bank 
autonomy, it is interesting to evaluate the impact of these articles of the 
Maastricht Treaty on the legal independence of this group of central 
banks ; Table 6 shows the changes in the legal independence index of 
these countries, as defined in C (92 ) ,  after the entry into force of these 
prohibitions. Note that the table does not consider the recent reforms of 
the central banks in countries such as France (1993) and Spain ( 1 994 ) ,  
which granted them a high degree of independence, but only the 
automatic effect of the prohibition of central bank credit to the 
government in all EU countries. The results of this Table show a 
substantial increase in the absolute and relative level of independence of 
EU central banks after the entry into force of this provision of the 
Maastricht Treaty13. The average value of the legal independence index 
of these 14 countries increased twofold, from 0 . 37 to 0 . 77 (the maximum 
theoretical value is 1 . 00) . As can be seen in Chart 1 ,  the EU central 
banks included in Table 4, which were more or less evenly distributed in 
the spectrum from more independent to less independent central banks 
before the "Maastricht effect" , tend to concentrate among the most 
independent banks after this effect is considered. From the top 10 on the 
right-hand side of Chart 1 ,  only Switzerland does not belong to the EU , 
and it is ranked 9th• 
These radical changes are partly a consequence of the sizable weight 
attributed to the monetary financing aspects of the legal independence 
index developed by Cukierman ( 1 992) , which represents 62.5% of the 
unweighted index and 50% of the weighted index. With a lower weight for 
these aspects, the "upgrading" of the EU countries since January 1994 
would have been less impresive. 
The effect analysed above is only an initial one due to the ban on 
monetary financing. The full effect of the Maastricht Treaty in this 
13 The trend towards greater central bank independence is not 
confined to the European area . OUtstanding examples of recent central 
bank reforms are New Zealand, Chile and Argentina.  Neverthe less, the 
indices of independence referred to in this article only cover the 
period until 1990. For the purpose of this section it is assumed that 
the legislation of non-EU central banks has not been changed. For an 
analysis of recent central banks' reforms in a broader geographical 
context see Lastra (1995 ) .  
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respect will imply a substantial additional increase in these legal 
independence indices , as the statutes are progressively reformed 
according to Treaty requirements . This process has recently begun with 
the new Laws approved in France in 1993 and Spain in 1994 . As an 
example , Table 7 presents the results of the legal independence index of 
C (92) with the new Law of Autonomy of the Banco de Espafia . From a 
value of 0 . 21 in the 1980's, this Bank's autonomy rose to 0 . 75 after the 
prohibition of monetary financing (see Table 6) and to 0 . 94 after the full 
reform of the statutes J close to the theoretical maximum14• 
Another interesting particularity of the. Maastricht framework is the 
supranational dimension of its approach to central bank autonomy . In the 
case of these countries, this autonomy is enforced by an international 
agreement , which can only be reformed with the unanimity of the member 
states . This fact confers upon the legislation on central bank autonomy 
a stability that probably exceeds the requirement of a constitutional 
reform in some other countries , because the abolition of central bank 
autonomy cannot be done at a national level, and requires the consent of 
the remaining members of the Union (unless a country is prepared to opt­
out of the European Union) .  By making the reform of the statutes of 
central banks more costly J this approach probably strengthens the 
commitment to central bank autonomy and enhances its effects . 
7 .  Conclusions 
1 - The elaboration of indices or classifications of central bank autonomy 
is a difficult task. The very concept of independence is elusive and 
subject to a number of nuances . International comparison requires the 
standardisation, interpretation and measurement of complex and distant 
legal and institutional situations . Furthermore , these situations evolve 
overtime, due to changes in the legislation affecting central banks . For 
this reason , the choice of the period of analysis may critically affect the 
results. 
14 According to own estimates , legal independence following the 
new statutes would be slightly above that of Germany in the case of 
Spain and slightly below in the case of France [using the methodology 
of Cukierman ] .  
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2- A particularly important question is the difference between 
theoretical and practical independence . The latter may be more relevant 
than the former, but at the same time is even more difficult to define 
objectively , which is an important drawback from the standpoint of 
in terna tiona! comparisons. 
3- The comparison between the indices of central bank autonomy and 
the aspects potentially affecting this independence shows -not 
surprisingly, given the above-mentioned difficulties- that in general they 
only consider a relatively small part of the features potentially affecting 
central bank autonomy . A very rudimentary "coverage index" is 
developed and applied to the different classifications , showing that only 
between 5% and 25% of the aspects identified as affecting independence are 
considered. 
4- Some classifications are re-elaborations of earlier ones . In order to 
assess the consistency of the results , the relevant comparison to be made 
is between classifications using different methodologies . This shows that 
the results -in terms of the rating of the countries- do not differ 
substantially among the " original" classifications, which can be 
interpreted as evidence of the relative reliability of the "traditional 
wisdom" on central banks' rankings by independence, despite the 
numerous problems referred to above. 
5- A particularly delicate problem is to find a trade-off between, on the 
one hand, analysing a period that . is long enough to permit the effect of 
central bank autonomy on inflation to stabilise, and, on the other hand, 
an adequate updating of the independence indices to legislative changes . 
A major and recent reform -the prohibition of monetary financing of the 
Maastricht Treaty- implied a radical change in the classification of central 
banks by autonomy , with a substantial upgrading of EU countries . Only 
time will tell whether a similar change in relative inflation performance will 
follow , whether other countries will implement similar reforms -a process 
which seems to be already starting- or whether the apparent relationship 
between central bank independence and inflation will fade away . 
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TABLB 2 
RBLBV1IJfT ASPECTS Of' cmrrRaL BAIIX nmBPDlDDCB 
1 Formal dependence of the central bank. 
2 Pormal assignment of reoponeability to develop monetary policy. 
3 Formal assignment of r._pen.ability to implement monetary policy. 
, Proviaiona for resolution of conflict • .  
, Statutory objectives. 
, Oen>OCratic accountability and 8uperviaion of monetary policy. 
7 Hechaniall'1s fo, reform at legislation governing the central bank. 
• composition of governing bodies. 
, Election of top ofticialB. 
10 Mandate of top official •• 
11 Renew_l of mandates 
12 Dilmi ... l of top officiala. 
II Limits on government financing. 
14 Budgetary independence 
" Distribution of profits. 
16 Banking 8uperyiaion. 
17 Exchange-rate policy. 
,. other functions 
19 Transparency ( including publication of di8cu •• ion8 and deliberations of governing 
bodies) . 
20 central bank ownersh.ip. 
21 Limits on the use ot monetary policy instrumenta. 
22 Independence in prepar ing ood p1.Iblhhing reports and public atatementll on economic 
policy questions. 
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Table 6 
CDK.IBRMAR'S LBGAL IROBPBNDBlfCB IROD: TBB Bn"BC'r 011' O'lNSIDBRIBG TBB 
PROHIBITION OF I«lRBTJUtY PIRMCIRG IK EO COORTRIBS, AP'l'ZR 'l'BB DAS'l'RICIft' '1'R&ATl' 
Germany 
Austria 
Greece 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Ireland 
Luxenbourg 
United Kingdom 
Prance 
sweden 
Finland 
Italy 
Spain 
Belgium 
Averg8 of countries 
listed above 
I')  Ix--.quo 
.... al 
� 
in tbe 1980B 
0.66 
0 . 58 
0.51 
0.47 
0 . 42 
0 . 39 
0 . 37 
0.31 
0.26 
0.27  
0.27  
0.22 
0.21 
0 . 19 
0 , 37 
PoBitioa in 
too rankiDg 
oE IS 
countriea 
11) 
2 
-
-
• 
• 
-
-
7 ( * )  
• 
10(* )  -
12 
13 
I. 
(1) ... t.abl.e . t..., tile r&l:ll<1"9 of the 15 o:ountri .. "oa.l�. 
.... al -
iDdB[ , • Po8ition in 
""- the ranking 
Maaatricht (3) 
12) 
0.91 1 
0 . 84 -
0.83 -
0.77 3 
0.61 2 
0 . 62 -
0 . 77 -
0.72  7 
0.73 S I * ) 0.70 8 
0.76 -
0.73 5( * ) 0.75 • 
0.67 10 
0,77 
(2) OWn ".l",,:w.Uoa. follOWing tWIt..,.." IIU2). 1_ ' to 16 of the 1..,.1 i� iDd_ of t.lIh .tI>dy t.lr. • •  ",d_ 
ot 1.0 .n..., Mu.trl""t. n.. ....... r to ...  or t.lIi. cv-.rlo ... h ... i9'-. t..e.II_ they conc.rn the r- ot the 
Unan.,i"9 .Dd • •  ft.., MaUtric:ht, tlMl finan"ing lr..lf 1. prolP.lb.1t.d (tilt. .ppl1 .. ln pouU""ar to q_.U0n8 11 .nd 
12/ _ Ubi. 7).  It ., .. d..::ldecl to ."i9n till. c: .... ntri .. tb8 ., • .uU".Uoa ClCIbK .. t .,klP. _!ami iD4ep8nd8 .....  
P) only tile .tt..,t of the proMblUon of ..... ury flNlllc:lng: on 1\1 COI,ItItri .. I\Q _n ........ 1�. Oth.., �t ,,1I&tog: .. 
la 1�1.1.Uon In IICIII·I\I """nUl_ h.8T. not. -.. t.lr.8n 1at<> ..,.,.,.."t. 
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TABLB 7 
CUlUBRMMII'S LEGAL INDBPBMDENCE INDUs BSTIMl\TB 01' THB 
D'FEC'l'S OF TRB NEW STATUTB OB TBB INDia FOR SPAIR 
Soain 
Characteristic. To 1980 1980-89 1994 
statute'*) 
l .  Governor ' s  mandate 0 0 . 2 5  0 . 7 5  
2 .  Election o f  Qovernor 0 . 2 5  0 0 
3 .  Dismissal o f  governor 0 0 0 . 83 
4 .  Incompatibility of Qovernor 0 1 1 
5 .  Formulation of monetarY ocliov 0 . 33 0 . 33 1 
6 .  Conflict resolution 0 0 1 
7 .  Role of central bank in 0 0 0 
Government budget 
8 .  Central bank obietivBS 0 0 . 6  1 
• •  Limitations on borrowing from 0.33 0 . 33 1 
central bank 
10. Limitations on lending of 0 0 1 
securities to qovernment 
11.  Decision over lendina terms 0 0 1 
12 . Size of lending to public 0 . 33 0 . 33 1 
sector 
13.  Types of limitations on 0 0 1 
Treasury borrowinq 
14. Limits on maturities of loans 0 0 1 
to Treasury 
15.  Interest rate on loans to 0 0 1 
Treasur 
16. Limits on purchase of debt by 0 0 1 
central bank in primary market 
TOTAL ( * * )  0 . 10 0 . 21 0.94 
( * )  Own calculat�onB. 
( ** )  The total i s  calculated as a simple average of 8 items: 
1 Simple average of items 1 to 4 
2 Simple average of items 5 to 7 
3 Item 8 
4 Item • 
5 Item 10 
6 Item 11 
7 Item 12 
8 Simple average of items 13 to 16 
- 35 -
RANKING OF COUNTRIES BY 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
( Before and after the monetary financing 
prohibition of the Maastricht Treaty )* 
BEFORE .'-f1l3R 
U.s. DENMARJ( 
CANADA 
AUSTRALIA 
u.s. 
CANADA 
AUSTRALIA 
NEY.' Z£ALAND 
JAPAN JAPAN 
, :;·1 
non·EU 
(*) Thl compllI'ison only takes into account the prohibition of n'IO",ltary fina�ln". 
but not othlr measures or legislation to IncrellH clntral bank Inependence. 
According to own estimates. If the new estatutes of thl central bMks of Spain 
and France Bre consldlred, their ranking wUI Increase to t III and 3rd .. respectively. 
Sourcls: 
Beforl: Cukierman (1992). 
Alter: own Istimatn based on OJkllrman', methodology. 
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